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Abstract
This paper focuses on the process of coalition formation conditioning the
common decision to adopt a shared good, which cannot be afforded by an
average single consumer and whose use cannot be exhausted by any single
consumer. An agent based model is developed to study the interplay between
these two processes: coalition formation and diffusion of shared goods. Coali-
tion formation is modelled in an evolutionary game theoretic setting, while
adoption uses elements from both the Bass and the threshold models. Coali-
tions formation sets the conditions for adoption, while diffusion influences the
consequent formation of coalitions. Results show that both coalitions and dif-
fusion are subject to network effects and have an impact on the information
flow though the population of consumers. Large coalitions are preferred over
small ones since individual cost is lower, although it increases if higher quanti-
ties are purchased collectively. The paper concludes by connecting the model
conceptualisation to the on-going discussion of diffusion of sustainable goods,
discussing related policy implications.
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1 Introduction
Diffusion is often studied as a consequence of the individual process of adoption
decision, overlooking cases where the decision is taken collectively (Rogers, 1962).
Individual adoption implies individual consumption, neglecting cases of collective
consumption. Similarly, group consumption (Borcherding and Filson, 2002) and
collective action are often studied in isolation (Olson, 1971; Hardin, 1982; Oliver,
1993) with no focus on the prior step of group formation, which, in turn, is mainly
examined in the game theory context (Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973; Komorita,
1974). This paper aims at combining the process of coalition formation leading to
the diffusion of a shared good, where consumers agree to act cooperatively in order
to share costs and use of a common property. Coalition formation and diffusion
are studied as two co-evolving processes. Coalitions are necessary for the diffusion
of shared goods, being adoption a collective decision; and diffusion influences the
consequent formation of coalitions since it changes the structure of the social network.
Large irrigation systems adopted by groups of farmers (Bardhan, 1993b,a, 2000)
is an example of expensive goods that are purchased by a coalition of people that has
coordinated themselves beforehand. These goods are common pool resources (CPR)
and can be classified as non-excludable and rival (Bowles, 2004). For them local
interactions among users guarantee a more efficient way of governance compared
to both privatisation or external regulation approaches (Ouchi, 1980; Ostrom, 1990;
Ostrom et al., 1994). Sustainable goods, such as large-sized decentralised energy
systems (DES), can be also considered as CPR (Wolsink, 2012). These are too
costly for individual households, but can be purchased by a group of neighbouring
households to access energy off the grid. In this perspective, policies aiming at
boosting diffusion of large-sized sustainable goods, requiring a direct involvement
of final users, need to consider adoption as a collective decision. And, by studying
the processes and dynamics that favourite formation of consumption groups, it is
possible to implement instruments to empower citizens whose role is crucial in the
transition towards a more sustainable economy.
Group adoption and diffusion of expensive common goods are gaining relevance
also in the transportation sector. The automotive industry has started to consider
shared ownership as an alternative to the individual car ownership and major man-
ufacturers have already tried to implement fractional ownership programs. This
approach is driven by a rapid change in people attitudes (Prieto et al., 2017; de Luca
and Di Pace, 2015) and in policy regulations. Cars are becoming expensive goods
for many, and the problem of prohibitive prices will be more acute with the intro-
duction into the market of autonomous or driverless vehicles. For these reasons,
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the promotion of group formation as preliminary step of group adoption may open
window of opportunities for shared ownership of next-generation vehicles (Masoud
and Jayakrishnan, 2016). Therefore, the process of coalition formation may modify
the standard views on the diffusion of new practices and technologies.
This paper develops an agent-based model (ABM) to study the diffusion of goods
that are characterised by high investment cost – above the budget constraint of an
average consumer – but affordable by a coalition of people acting cooperatively. The
model simulates the process of coalition formation that co-evolves with diffusion,
which results from the collective decision to adopt an expensive shared good. Coali-
tion formation is modelled in an evolutionary game theoretic setting (Axtell, 1999,
2002), while adoption uses elements from both the Bass and the threshold models.
In the agent-based model, agents sequentially interact in order to form a coalition:
they form links, communicate, evaluate options, establish stable groups and even-
tually adopt a shared good that produces a services which is alternatively available
from a centralised provider but at a higher cost. Collective adoption is feasible only
when a coalition is stable. Social interactions and individual characteristics play an
important role in the bargaining process to form the coalition (Oliver and Myers,
2003). Negotiation is necessary in order to find an agreement before the common
investment. The agreement is not only cost-based but it also takes into account as-
pects of shared ownership and shared consumption. Therefore, the decision to adopt
in coalition is related to the overall utility deriving by sharing the common property
in its utilisation and ownership. When adopted, the shared good guarantees a more
economic and efficient service compared to the existing supply, thereby fostering its
diffusion.
Results show that the formation of coalitions and the diffusion of shared goods
co-evolve. Both are subject to network effects: agents’ behaviour is affected by oth-
ers’ decision and by societal trends, and the social network evolves because of the
changing links between consumers. Although the formation of coalitions is essen-
tial to the adoption of shared goods, they also reduce future adoption, by isolating
consumers that do not find a suitable coalition on time. Diffusion of shared goods
crucially depends on the speed at which networks form and information circulates,
and on the composition of individual geography. Consumers prefer to form larger
coalitions which allow them to buy expensive goods with higher capacity, rather than
smaller coalitions that can adopt smaller goods.
The paper has the following structure: the next section reviews the literature
regarding diffusion and coalition formation. Based on these two, the model con-
ceptualisation is explained. Section 3 presents the mathematical formulation of the
model and its sequential process of coalition formation. Section 4 presents and dis-
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cusses the results. Section 5 concludes, with a discussion on the potential of this
model in the context of diffusion of sustainable goods and its policy implications.
2 The Literature: Diffusion and Coalition Forma-
tion
The modelling strategy in this paper builds on two rich literatures: diffusion of
innovation (especially in networks) and coalition formation. This section briefly
discusses each in turn.
Diffusion of innovation in networks
Innovation diffusion theory often deals with individual adoption decision. It re-
gards the decision-making process in which a potential adopter defines his/her choice
throughout time, by gradually increasing awareness of adopting. The role of initia-
tors or early knowers is pivotal in the diffusion process (Rogers, 1962) since they
create the initial critical mass (Gersho and Mitra, 1975). Over time, social interac-
tions become important for diffusion, facilitating imitation effect (Bass, 1969) and
fashion effect (Smallwood and Conlisk, 1979; Arthur, 1989). Later adopters may
imitate the innovation behaviour of early adopters in order to reach the same so-
cial status (Tarde, 1962). Therefore, interactions among individuals determine the
bandwagon effect which impacts later adopters (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993,
1997). Hence, diffusion process is related to the influence of the social network on
potential adopters (Burt, 1987).
To examine the role of social networks, diffusion is also studied as part of network
theory, where adopters are modelled as nodes of a social network and links represent
the interactions necessary to spread information among nodes (Rogers, 1976; Cowan
and Jonard, 2004). In this context, diffusion is shown to depend on the network
structure (Delre et al., 2010; Peres, 2014), and three structures are often studied. The
regular network (or lattice strucutre) is locally very dense and has a long average path
since every node has the same number of nearest neighbours. With this structure,
diffusion is slow since information must travel around the whole network before
reaching nodes located at the opposite side. The small world structure, as developed
by Watts and Strogatz (1998), is a regular network in which few randomly chosen
links are reconnected to distant nodes. This structure maintains the same level
of clustering of the regular network, but reduces dramatically the average path,
resulting in a faster diffusion process. In random networks (Erdos and Renyi, 1960)
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nodes are connected randomly to each other. This structure has low average path and
low clustering, resulting in fast diffusion, although nodes are not locally connected.
The agent-based model developed in this paper is built upon notions from this
literature. It uses elements from the Bass and other threshold models, in which
the role of initiators is central. People awareness is simulated in the model by
taking into account both the bandwagon effect and interpersonal relations needed
to communicate and spread information. The social network is also considered:
agents are nodes of a network whose structure is not fixed, but evolves throughout
time allowing for the formation of new links spatially bounded. Social networks
evolve over time, as new links are formed and existing links are severed, influencing
information flows and individuals’ decisions, which are, consequently, dynamic and
spatial-dependent (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Dutta and Mutuswami, 1997; Bala
and Goyal, 1998; Johnson and Gilles, 2000; Jackson and Watts, 2002). In the evolving
process of network formation, highly connected nodes are hubs in the social structure,
and they accelerate the contagion between individuals, thereby facilitating diffusion
over the network (Barabasi, 2002).
However, the model in this paper differs in two main aspects with respect to
the literature on diffusion over networks. First, instead of studying which network
structure facilitates or prevents diffusion, it studies diffusion that co-evolves with
the process of group formation, as the network of linked individuals grows. Second,
the diffusion process is not considered to be dependent on an individual adoption
decision, but, conversely, it is studied as a collective decision, conditioned by prior
steps of coalition formation (Schlager, 1995).
Coalition formation
Coalition formation has been mainly studied in game theory. Studies on coalitions
in triad (Caplow, 1956; Gamson, 1961) and the n-person coalition formation games,
with n>3 (Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973; Komorita, 1974), have analysed the bar-
gaining process among agents in relation to individual resources. Negotiation is in-
fluenced by the initial distribution of resources and coalition members aim at forming
coalitions that guarantee stability. Smaller coalitions are most likely to be formed
compared lager coalitions since the probability to reach common agreement and reci-
procity is higher. The hedonic coalitions literature (Dreze and Greenberg, 1980) has
studied the process of coalition formation in relation to individuals’ effort, where the
objective is to carry out joint activities. In these models the individual payoff de-
pends on own and other members’ characteristics and efforts. As a result, members
tend to form coalitions that maximise the common utility. Hedonic coalitions have
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been used, for example, to investigate strategic alliances among firms (Axelrod et al.,
1995) and task allocations within an organisation (Shehory and Kraus, 1998).
The agent-based model presented in this paper embeds features emerging from
this literature. It considers the use of individual resources in a common effort and the
bargaining mechanism among agents. It also evaluates the impact of the number of
players involved in the process and how collaboration and coordination among players
takes place. However, whereas game theory helps to understand how rational agents
behave when they interact to form a coalition and which features maximise social
and individual welfare, organisational transformation are driven by heterogeneous
agents and bounded rationality (Simon, 1991; Windrum et al., 2009). Accordingly,
evolutionary game theory makes it possible to relax the common assumptions of
homogeneity and rationality and to focus more on the agents’ behaviour which might
bring to stable equilibrium in the whole system. The model in this paper fits in the
category of sequential games of coalition formation as those formulated by Bloch
(1995, 1996) and Mutuswami and Winter (2002), but is closer to the evolutionary
model on firms formation by Axtell (1999, 2002). Nevertheless, we differ from the
these models in a number of ways.
Bloch (1995, 1996) models the process of pairwise coalition formation with infinite
horizon and with finite number of players. In these models the aim is to find a stable
equilibrium with all the players belong to a coalition. Mutuswami and Winter (2002)
extend those models, allowing agents to remain out of coalitions and have a payoff
equal to zero. They introduces in the offer to form a coalition a “conditional cost
contribution” (Mutuswami and Winter, 2002, p. 244) which represents the cost an
agent is willing to pay to form the coalition. Both Bloch (1995, 1996) and Mutuswami
and Winter (2002) study the payoff division rule that guarantees stability, efficiency
and equity among agents. While Bloch (1995, 1996) assumes a fixed sharing rule
of the surplus among agents, Mutuswami and Winter (2002) analyse the formation
game with exogenous payoff determination.
The model in this paper allow for singletons, but it differs from previous liter-
ature since acting as singleton or joining a coalition are two alternative options to
receive a service and to gain some benefit. In the model, agents involved in the
bargaining process communicate their demand for the service and the monetary con-
tribution they are willing to commit into the common investment, similar to Axtell
(2002). This contribution is a portion of agent’s income and it is the amount that
maximises individual utility. Agent’s decision is not only based on individual income
and demand, but it also considers consumption preferences, such as the “preference
for income” as proposed by Axtell (1999, p. 9; 2002, p. 1083). Agent’s utility in
coalition is related to the monetary contribution that other members have commit-
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ted, and to the cumulative coalition demand for the service. Therefore, since agents
adapt their behaviour and choices in relation to the evolving interactions with others,
their attitude towards the common investment in coalition changes over time.
In this paper the interest is not on how the outcome or surplus is distributed
among agents in coalition, as in Bloch (1995, 1996) and Mutuswami and Winter
(2002). Contrarily, the focus is on what condition guarantees higher utility to agents,
that decide to invest a portion of their income into the common good. Utility,
therefore, is not deriving from the division of an outcome or a surplus, but it regards
the use in coalition of a good purchased commonly. To do so, the model adapts
the utility function proposed by Axtell (2002) where a parameter allows for the
combination of both the equal share and proportional division rule of the coalition
payoff, which is endogenously determined. This utility function is further developed
in this paper, by considering the proportional use of the good.
Built on this literature, the model in this paper fits in the category of sequential
models of coalition formation with the “best reply” type of adjustment dynamic,
that are common in the evolutionary game theory (Axtell, 1999, 2002). It makes
it possible to overcome two common difficulties relative to the one-stage models of
coalition formation, as explained by Bloch and Dutta (2011). First, agents in sequen-
tial models of coalition formation are not anymore ”myopic”, meaning that they are
aware of what might be the subsequent outcomes. Second, sequential models are
more likely to result in efficient coalitions since agents are ”forward-looking” and
there is an endogenous resolution of the problem of coordination among agents.
In conclusion, by combining different contributions from diffusion and game the-
ory in one agent-based model, this paper aims at contributing to the discussion on
the diffusion of shared goods, for which a collective adoption is required.
3 The Model
The model in brief
The model studies a population of heterogeneous agents that, at the beginning of
the simulation, act as singletons and they satisfy their demand for a service through
a general provider. However, some agents may have interest to purchase a common
good, whose cost is larger than anyone’s income, but it can provide the same service
as an alternative to the supply of the general provider. This second option requires
to form a coalition of consumers. Agents are self-interested and the spontaneous
process of coalition formation is driven by the individual interest in reaching a better
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individual utility and a cost reduction compared to the first option. In the latter,
regarding singletons with the general provider, both the cost and the utility are
fixed and only depend on individual characteristics. While agents’ cost and utility
in the second option depend not only on individual characteristics but also on those
of the other coalition’s members and on characteristics of the coalition itself, such
as its size. Driven by their interests, agents interact, attempt to form coalitions
and compare the different formations. Agents adjust behaviour in relation to the
interactions taking place during the process of coalition formation and their decision
is also influenced by external events occurring in the whole population, such as
changes in the social network. Agents decides to establish a coalition when it is
stable and their individual utility is higher and individual cost is lower compared to
the case of acting as singleton. Under these conditions, agents in coalition decide to
purchase the common good jointly and to share its utilisation, increasing the rate of
diffusion. The adoption decision is then maintained until the end of the simulation,
conditioning subsequent coalition formation processes since adoption of the shared
good modifies the network structure.
Agents’ categorisation
At the outset of the simulation, agents are node of a regular network. They have
a maximum of l neighbours with whom they can tie and form a link. Neighbours
are spatially limited and they must be within one step from the originating node,
because the shared good provides a localised service. In fact, it is assumed that the
shared good is non-movable and, once purchased in coalition, it has to be installed
in a specific location.
The model distinguishes between regular, active, and initiator agents. The se-
quential game of coalition formation starts with m random chosen agents. They are
initiators and symbolise innovators or early knower needed for the take off of the
diffusion process (Rogers, 1962). In the model, initiators have a real interest in pur-
chasing the common good, and this strong motivation gives them three major roles
in the game. Action 1: they can contact neighbours and form new links in order
to enlarge the network of agents to be involved in the coalition formation process.
Action 2: among a set of goods available in the market, they decide which one they
want to purchase collectively, and propose this investment to others. Action 3: they
start the process of coalition formation, which consist on exploring the possibility to
make the investment in cooperation with others.
An initiator is always active, while the inverse relation is not always valid. A
regular agent becomes active when s/he is contacted by an initiator through Action
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1 and a bidirectional link is formed between the two. By means of this interaction
information flows among agents and new agents become aware of the opportunity
to make the common investment and to replace the centralised service provider.
When active agents become initiators they can tie new links, thereby continuing the
processes of knowledge diffusion following the percolation diffusion model in networks
(Mort, 1991; David and Foray, 1994; Solomon et al., 2000). An active agent becomes
initiator when the interest for the investment in coalition is higher compared to a
minimum level, computed endogenously each time step. This threshold is defined
visibility, as in Faber et al. (2010), and represents the minimum level of agent’s
awareness towards the new good. Every time step a random value, RND ∈ [0; 1], is
generated and associated to active agents. An active agent becomes initiator when
this value is lower than the visibility (Wt):
Wt = MAX[Vt−1;min[1;Adv + (ShareInCoalitiont−1)ξ]] (1)
where Adv is the level of advertising, exogenously defined, as in the Bass model;
ShareInCoalitiont−1 is the share of agents that have already established a coalition;
and ξ is an exogenous parameter reflecting the bandwagon effect (Smallwood and
Conlisk, 1979). Once an active agent becomes initiator, this characteristic is main-
tained for the remaining time steps. Only initiators can contact other agents, tie
new links, and start the process of coalition formation. As more capital goods are
diffused in coalition, visibility increases, and more agents may become initiators, in-
creasing the likelihood that agents are involved in coalition formation and adoption.
However, agents who already belong to coalitions, having switched to the common
good, cannot participate in further coalition formation processes, thereby reducing
the number of initiators and the likelihood that new agents are contacted. For this
reason, coalition formation and diffusion are studied as two co-evolving processes.
Process of coalition formation
Agents (i) are heterogeneous in respect to their demand for the service (di), income
(ei) and preference for income (θi). They are also heterogeneous in respect to their
preference towards shared consumption (αi) and shared contribution (βi), occurring
in coalition. At the beginning of the simulation all agents purchase the service form
a general provider at a cost (ci1 in Eq.2) which is function of their demand and of the
unitary price for the service (p1). This individualistic consumption option produces
an utility to agents which has a Cobb-Douglas structure and is written as in Eq.3.
The utility as singleton reduces with the cost (ci1), relative to income, and increases
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with consumption (di). The relative importance of each factor depends on agent’s
preference (θi1).
ci1 = dip1 (2)
Ui1(ei; ci1; di; θi1) = (ei − ci1)θi1(di)1−θi1 = [ei − dip1]θi1(di)1−θi1 (3)
In each time period the process of coalition formation begins with initiators that
randomly tie a new bidirectional link with one of their neighbours not yet linked
(Action 1). Initiators then choose the product they want to purchase and propose
the investment to their linked neighbours (Action 2). The choice is done considering
the set of products available in the market, each of them with different investment
cost (I), maximum amount of service supplied (S) and unitary price for the service
(p2). A product q is chosen randomly with probability proportional to its diffusion
share (Diffq) over the total number of products already adopted (
∑Q
q=1Diffq).
Therefore, the probability that a product is chosen by an initiator is:
Ωq =
Diffq + 1
(
Q∑
q=1
Diffq) +Q
(4)
where the terms (+1) and (+Q) are needed in order to guarantee equal probabilities
at the beginning of the simulation, when diffusion is zero. Initiators, therefore, are
subject to the indirect network influence. This feature integrates in the model the
concepts of imitation and fashion effects that are common in diffusion theory.
Next, initiators start the formation of coalitions and explore the option to invest
with others (Action 3). Purchase a shared good in coalition is a common action
and therefore agents’ cost and utility depend on many more factors and conditions
compared to the case of acting as singleton. The individual cost in coalition (ci2 in
Eq.5) depends not only on agent’s demand (di) and on the unitary price (p2), but
also on the the monetary contribution that an agent is willing to commit in the joint
investment (xi: xi<I). xi is the value that maximises agent’s utility in coalition,
such that Ui2: dUi2/dx=0. Also the utility in coalition has a Cobb-Douglas structure
and is written as in Eq.6.
ci2 = dip2 + xi (5)
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Ui2(ei; ci2; di;D−i;xi;X−i;N ; θi2;αi; βi) =
= (ei − ci2)θi2{(di +D−i)[ αidi
di +D−i
+ (1− αi)( βixi
xi +X−i
+
1− βi
N
)]}1−θi2 =
= [ei − (dip2 + xi)]θi2{(di +D−i)[ αidi
di +D−i
+ (1− αi)( βixi
xi +X−i
+
1− βi
N
)]}1−θi2
(6)
where θi2 ∈ [0; 1] is the preference for income; 1-θi2 is the preference for con-
sumption; αi ∈ [0; 1] the importance given by agent to the proportional division rule
based on consumption; βi ∈ [0; 1] measures the preference for the proportional rule to
divide the shared investment based on the agent’s contribution, with respect to the
equal rule, when all agents receive the same amount of service, irrespective from the
contribution (1-βi); N is the coalition size; X−i and D−i are, respectively, the total
monetary contribution and the total demand of the other N − i coalition members
belonging to the coalition.
As in Axtell (1999, 2002), this utility function is dependent on the coalition
formation process itself and takes into account both agents’ characteristics and their
willingness to commit part of their income into the common investment.1 Higher
θi2 indicates a higher preference for saving rather than consuming, reducing the
propensity to invest in coalition. Contrarily, lower θi2 indicates more inclination to
buy the good in coalition, hence more inclination to shared consumption. Utility
in coalition is function of others’ presence in the group and agent’s attitude change
accordingly. Higher αi indicates that an agent gives higher importance to the division
rule based on the shared consumption, rather than to the fact that s/he has to share
the cost with others and that the coalition has a total of N members. So, parameter
βi discriminates between the proportional division based on cost sharing and the total
number of coalition members. Higher βi gives more importance to the first factor in
comparison to the coalition size. The individual utility in coalition also depends on
the sum of the contributions and on the demand of the other N − i members. The
total coalition monetary contribution is X, where X=
∑
xi and X−i=(X-xi). In the
same way, the total coalition demand is D, where D=
∑
di and D−i=(D-di). X−i
and D−i indicate the relationship between agent’s utility and others’ decisions.2
Agents involved in Action 3 evaluate cost and utility of the investment in coali-
tion in comparison to the status of singleton. First, an initiator evaluates coalition
1Please see Annex I for a complete discussion regarding the properties of equation 6 and its
parameters.
2To be noted that Eq.3 derives from Eq.6 being N=1 and D−i=X−i=0.
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with one of his/her linked neighbours (N=2). Then, one of the two coalition mem-
bers chooses randomly one of his/her linked neighbours and invites him/her to join
the coalition and evaluate the investment proposed by the initiator (N=3). After
evaluation, one more linked neighbour is invited. Actions 2 and 3 are repeated a
number of time in each time step, allowing agents to evaluate different coalitions for
different investments. However, given bounded rationality, agents do not evaluate
all the possible combinations of products and coalitions.
The evaluation process is a multi-step bargaining process with iterations that
happens in every single time step of the simulation.3 Negotiation is necessary be-
cause agents try to maximise individual utility in coalition, which depends on own
characteristics and preferences and on others’ attitudes. Agents announce their in-
dividual contribution (xi) every iteration, which determines continuos variation in
the value of X−i. In other words, agents adjust behaviour continuously in relation
to other agents’ announcement and to new opportunities, aiming at improving in-
dividual utility and at experiencing cost reduction. Coalition formation, therefore,
is modelled as a dynamic and long process of continuous interactions among agents
because many features evolve over time and agents adapt behaviour accordingly.
The goal of the iterative process of coalition formation is to find stability among
group’s members. A coalition is stable when Pareto efficiency is reached – each
member is better off without making at least one other worse off. More specifically,
in a stable coalition (i) all members maximise their utility; (ii) no member has an
incentive to move to another coalition; and (iii) no other agent would prefer to enter
the coalition. Two more conditions must be satisfied to reach stability among the
group of agents. First, the sum of all members monetary contributions has to be at
least equal to the investment cost (I) and not exceeding 110% of its value (Eq.7).
Second, the common investment capacity (S) must satisfy the total coalition demand
(Eq.8). Formally:
I ≤ xi +X−i ≤ I ∗ 1.1 (7)
di +D−i ≤ S (8)
Pareto efficiency and conditions in equations 7 and 8 guarantee coalition stability.
This is also granted by two further conditions: members’ utility (cost) in coalition is
higher (lower) than utility (cost) as singleton (Eq.9 and Eq.10). Formally:
3Annex II, by means of an illustrative and numerical example, describes in detail the process
of coalition formation and its evaluation.
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Ui2 > Ui1 (9)
ci2 < ci1 (10)
The evaluation process may bring to several stable coalitions, since size deter-
mines different cost and utility for agents. Therefore, after each evaluation, agents
individually make a conditional decision among the option to invest via a particular
coalition or to remain singleton. Among the two, the option that makes an agent
better off is stored as optimal. If a subsequent coalition guarantees higher utility and
lower cost in comparison to the optimal condition stored previously, the decision is
updated. At the and of the evaluation process, a final decision is taken. All agents an-
nounce separately their optimal decision. If it regards the common investment, they
announce the coalition they aim to set up. If all members of this coalition announce
that this option is also their optimal option, then, coalition is established. Under
these conditions, the common good is purchased by the coalition and agents adopt.
Adopters, however, go out of the game, hence they cannot communicate anymore
with others and they cannot take part to future coalition formation processes
The shared investment, in fact, provides the service to agents in coalition for
the rest of the simulation. This means that agents are locked-in and do not modify
their choice, under the assumption that a change implies higher infrastructural costs
compared to the option to remain.
The model and the diffusion of sustainable goods
The model conceptualisation, as described in the sections above, can be easily linked
to the diffusion process of sustainable goods for which large initial investment is
needed, as for example decentralised energy systems (DES). These are energy power
systems that need to be installed close to final users allowing them to be directly
connected to the energy source. Hence, the regular network is the most suitable
structure to simulate the social environment where local interactions occur among
neighbours. Currently, people living in a neighbourhood satisfy energy needs (di)
by means of the centralised energy system, for which only a price is paid for the
relative consumption (p1). DES is a more economic alternative option to satisfy the
same energy needs. However, because of the elevate infrastructural costs, investment
related to DES (I) is only feasible if a group of closed neighbours agrees to do it in
cooperation. These local communities need to be stable since the shift to a decen-
tralised and autonomous energy infrastructure requires not only shared investment
13
and ownership of the new common property but also shared consumption, which is
bounded by its maximum capacity (S). Therefore, neighbours willing to move to
DES have to contribute to the common purchase (xi) and to pay a price (p2) for the
relative consumption, which is lower than the current electricity price paid to the
centralised energy provider. Attitude towards more sustainable options is very much
related to people preferences, particularly if they, in order to satisfy consumption
needs (1-θi2), have to share the common resource (αi and βi) and their participation
implies income reduction (θi2). Consequently, people participation in energy com-
munities is not only a cost-based decision (Eq.10) but, more importantly, it depends
on their overall utility deriving from the sharing experience (Eq.9).
The formation of local communities is not immediate, but it requires time and
numerous social interactions among neighbours. When the role of external enabling
actors is not considered (i.e. private utilities or public bodies), the spontaneous
process of group formation has to start from early knowers, having strong moti-
vation towards the shift to a different energy infrastructure. Through continuous
interactions, information flows across the neighbourhood, and more and more people
is informed on the opportunity to install a DES in their local area. The decision
to establish an energy community is the result of a long negotiation process since
several constraints and opportunities emerge along with the increase of interested
neighbours. When a DES is commonly purchased and installed, people connected to
it have committed themselves in a costly investment which implies drastic changes
in the energy infrastructure. For this reason, adopters do not participate in fur-
ther negotiations since replacement would incur a high sunk costs. In conclusion,
the process of coalition formation may modify the standard view on the diffusion of
sustainable goods, such as DES, for which local communities are instrumental for
adoption.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Model initialisation
The model simulates the co-evolution of coalition formation and diffusion of shared
goods in a population of P = 200 agents. Tables 1 and 2 report the initial values
of the parameters. Agents are distributed on a regular network and it represents a
relatively large neighbourhood (Figure 1). Only 2% are initiators (m=4), randomly
chosen at the beginning of the simulation (t=0). Each agent has eight potential
neighbours (l = 8) with whom they can tie links (dotted edges in Figure 1) and form
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a coalition.4 Two different sensitivity analyses will evaluate whether the diffusion
outcome changes in relation to the variation of these two parameters: number of
initial informed agent (m) and size of neighbourhood, or network clustering (l).
Parameters Value
Total population of agents P 200
Number of initiators at t=0 m* 4
Spatially bounded links in the neigh-
bourhood
l* 8
Income ei µ=1000, σ=250
Demand di µ=45, σ=10
Preference θi1=θi2 µ=0.5, σ=0.1
Preference for proportional division
rule (consumption)
αi 0.5
Preference for proportional division
rule (contribution) and equal share di-
vision rule (size)
βi 0.5
Advertising Adv 0.01
Bandwagon effect ξ 0.85
* Parameter analysed
Table 1: Model initialisation
Agents are heterogeneous in terms of income (ei), demand (di) and preference
for income (θi) and all values are proportional and compatible. Individual values
are assigned randomly from a normal distribution. Agents have the same preference
for the service regardless from whether it is bought from the general provider or
produced by the joint investment (θi1=θi2). They are homogeneous in respect to the
two remaining preferences: proportional division rule based on consumption (α=0.5)
and proportional division rule based on contribution and equal share division rule
based on coalition size (β=0.5). This setup allows the analysis of the co-evolving
phenomena by considering heterogeneity in respect to agents’ individual characteris-
tics and homogeneity in relation to their attitudes towards shared consumption and
contribution.5 Agent’s awareness towards the common investment increases at each
time step (Adv=1%), meaning that chances for more agents to become initiators
4Although the degrees of separation between agents in a coalition may be larger then one, as
members may invite their own neighbours and so on.
5In order to test the impact of agents’ heterogeneity over these two preferences, the model has
been also run with three different initialisations: i) αi:(0.5;0.1) and βi:(0.5;0); ii) αi:(0.5;0) and
βi:(0.5;0.1); iii) αi:(0.5;0.1) and βi:(0.5;0.1). Under these conditions, the adoption share increases,
on average, by about 8% compared to the outcome with homogeneous agents.
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Figure 1: Initial regular network, 200 agents
increase over time. Further, the bandwagon effect related to the share of adopters is
almost linear (ξ=0.85).
There are ten shared goods available in the market that initiator agents can
choose for their common investment (Table 2), as alternative to the singleton option.
Each of them has a different cost and a different maximum level of the service that
can be provided. These value are strongly correlated: the higher the investment cost
(I), the higher the supply (S) and the lower the unit price for the service (p2). Price
that singletons pay to receive the service from a general provider is much bigger than
price related to the option concerning the investment in coalition (p1>>p2).
The model has a time horizon of 200 time steps, where each step defines the time
needed to initiate a face-to-face contact and to evaluate investment in coalition. To
control for the random effects, results are presented as averages over 40 simulations
with different random seeds.
4.2 Diffusion in Coalition: Emergent Properties
This section first discuss the emerging aggregate properties of the model. The model
simulates agents’ interactions aiming at forming coalition needed to buy jointly a
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Product Investment (I) Capacity (S) Price (p2)
q1 500 200 5.00
q2 600 250 4.75
q3 700 300 4.50
q4 800 350 4.25
q5 900 400 4.00
q6 1000 450 3.75
q7 1100 500 3.50
q8 1200 550 3.25
q9 1300 600 3.00
q10 1400 650 2.75
Price singleton (p1) 10.00
Table 2: Model initialisation: available products
common good to replace service provision from a centralised provider. At the outset,
only 2% of the population is aware of the good. The information is spread throughout
the network by means of contacts among agents.
Diffusion
After 200 periods, about 75% of the population is informed of the opportunity to
buy jointly a common good (active agents in Figure 2), confirming that on a regular
network contagion is relatively slow, as discussed in section 2.6 Information is spread
throughout the network by means of contacts among agents, but not all agents have
been aware of the opportunity to invest in coalition and to evaluate this option. Two
factors are relevant for this result. First, potential direct links are geographically
bounded, due to the need to adopt a good that provide a service locally, and that
an agent can communicate only to the nearest neighbours (l=8). This implies that,
the limited network clustering reduces the speed of dissemination. Second, the low
number of initiators (m=4) slows down the initial contagion, since the formation of
new links and dissemination of information start from these agents.
Awareness, does not imply adoption: only 50% of the population establishes a
coalition and adopts the shared good. The cumulative adoption follows the charac-
teristic S-shaped curve, although adoption is higher in the initial time steps compared
to traditional diffusion curves. This is due to the fact that, when adoption in coali-
6In order to test whether the random network impacts positively adoption and information
flow, the model is run with this network structure. Accordingly, the final share of adopters is 72%,
increasing by 45% compared to the regular network; and all agents in the population are informed.
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Figure 2: Cumulative share of active agents and agent in coalition
tion reaches a higher utility than buying from the central provider, the common
investment certainly reduces the risk of early adopters.7 50% adoption rate is not
new in the literature on diffusion of capital goods, as for example in the diffusion
process of eco-innovations such as for micro-CHP (Faber et al., 2010) and electric
vehicles (Higgins et al., 2012; Shafiei et al., 2012).
Size of coalitions and shared investment
Initiators may choose among ten different products (q1−q10), where q1 is the smallest
and cheapest, but which provides the service with the highest unit cost; and q10 is the
largest and most expensive, providing the service at the lowest unit cost. Initiators
choose randomly the one they want to purchase with others before starting the
process of coalition formation. Every time step, a different probability to be chosen
is associated to each product (Eq.4): the more a product is adopted, the higher is
the probability to be chosen (Ωq). Figure 3 shows the value of Ωq for each of the ten
products over time. At the very beginning of the simulation all products have the
same probability to be chosen. After a transition period in which probabilities vary
rapidly, a long term pattern is observed.
The most-chosen products are those with a lower investment cost (I), lower ca-
pacity (S) and higher unit cost (p2). Among these, products q1 and q2 are those
that have the highest rate of adoption during the initial time steps. This is due
7In order to test whether the model is able to reproduce the traditional S-shaped diffusion
curve, Annex III presents diffusion outcome when uncertainties are added at the beginning of the
process. It is shown that uncertainty does reduce initial levels of adoption.
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Figure 3: Product probability to be chosen, Ωq
to both the network structure and coalition size. At the beginning there are few
initiators that can tie links with neighbours, the network of connected agents is far
from dense, and there are few active agents that can enter in coalitions. Therefore,
only small coalitions can be evaluated and established, which have a small budget
and can afford less expensive goods, as Figure 4 shows.8
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Figure 4: Share of agents in coalition, for each product adopted
8These results resonate with notions of group size developed in the collective action literature
(Olson, 1971) and in the coalition formation literature (Komorita, 1974). Accordingly, small groups
are formed faster than bigger groups and these are more stable than the others. Further, coordi-
nation among agents in large-sized groups requires more time and in these formations agents have
higher bargaining power and higher opportunity to defect.
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Figure 4 plots the share of adopters for different coalition sizes (between 3-13) and
type of capital good purchased. The figure shows that agents organise themselves
in different coalitions to buy specific products. Larger coalitions are established
to adopt goods with higher investment cost and higher capacity, whereas smaller
coalition are formed to purchase smaller goods. However, depending on the product
purchased, some coalitions are more likely to be formed compared to others. For
small investments, one type of coalition (small) is markedly more frequent than
others. The variability of coalition size increases with I and S, meaning that larger
goods are purchased by more heterogeneous types of coalitions (in terms of size).
Based on these results, the following propositions can be put forward.9
Proposition 1: The investment costs (I) and capacity (S) of the shared goods
adopted in coalition increase with the coalition size.
Proposition 2: Coalitions tend to be of homogeneous size (small) when purchas-
ing common goods with low I and S. The heterogeneity of coalition size increases
with I and S.
Figure 5 plots the average number of options evaluated before establishing a
coalition and its size: there is a positive and significant correlation between the two.
Beside the timing (smaller coalitions are evaluated early in time, when few agents
are active), this result suggests that, when agents have the opportunity to choose
between smaller and larger coalitions, they opt for the latter. In fact, during the
decisional process, agents evaluate of all possible coalitions that increase their size
incrementally. Therefore, when agents decide to establish large coalitions, they have
already evaluated smaller ones. Hence, larger coalitions are preferred over smaller
coalitions.10
Proposition 3: Agents prefer larger coalitions, with larger investments and low-
ers unit cost, despite they take longer to form.
9Statistical tests are run for this and for all the other propositions put forward based on the
modelling results. Table 3 at the end of section 4 summarises correlation coefficients for these tests.
10This result may support criticisms of Olson’s theories of small groups, suggesting that also
large groups may favour collective action (Hardin, 1982; Oliver and Marwell, 1988).
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Figure 5: Average number of options evaluated by agents before establishing a coali-
tion
Average contribution to coalition
In the model, agents commit a monetary contribution (xi) to the common invest-
ment that maximises their utility (Ui2), and it varies with respect to preferred size
of coalition and shared good. Figure 6 plots the individual average contribution by
coalition size and, within each coalition, by type of common good. The larger the
coalition (N), the lower the average agent’s monetary contribution (xi), regardless
the level of the investment cost. Whereas, for a specific coalition size, the larger
the investment cost (I) and its maximum supply (S) the higher the average agent’s
individual contribution (xi). This result conforms with the theory of sharing groups
showing that the more the people in coalition, the less the individual costs, and the
larger the quantity purchased in group, the higher the individual cost (Lindenberg,
1982).
Proposition 4: Average agent’s contribution to the shared investment (xi) de-
creases with coalition size (N) and increases with the size of the investment (I and S).
Free riding
In large coalitions individual behaviour is non-influential for the whole group: as
group size grows, the individual contribution becomes less relevant. This may give
raise to free-riding, and explains the tensions in large groups between cooperation
and free-riding (Canning, 1995; Glance et al., 1997; Huberman and Glance, 1996;
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Figure 6: Average agents’ contribution in coalition per size and product
Shehory and Kraus, 1998; Axtell, 2000). In the process of coalition formation aim-
ing at purchasing a common good this relation is confirmed only partially. Figure
7 plots the share of free riders by coalition size.11 The average share of free-riders
in coalitions increases with coalition size up to a point (N=8), when it decreases
again. Large coalitions purchase, on average, large and expensive common goods
which require commitment of all members. This conforms with the idea that the
role of certain players is essential to achieve Pareto improvements in group cooper-
ation resulting after negotiation (Elliott and Golub, 2013). And, in agreement with
Ga¨chter and Fehr (1999), social approval in collective action reduces the opportunity
to have a free-riding attitude.
Proposition 5: The relation between free-riding and coalition size follows an
inverted V-shaped curve.
4.3 Network analysis
Coalition formation and collective adoption occur in a network of agents whose struc-
ture evolves over time. This section, therefore, studies how adoption and network
structure co-evolve, as part of the coalition formation process.
11Free-riders are coalition members that do not contribute to the common investment (xi=0),
but pay the unit consumption costs (ci2>0).
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Figure 7: Free-riding agents
The co-evolution between coalition formation and diffusion
In each time step t, neighbours of agent i can assume one of the following status:
linked (fit), not linked yet (git) or in coalition (hit). Hence, based on the model
initialisation (see Table 1), lit=
∑
fit+
∑
git+
∑
hit=8. Given wt the total number
of active agents at time t, it is possible to calculate the share of linked neighbours
for active agent (Lt, Eq.11) and the share of linked and not linked neighbours in the
total population (Vt, Eq.12) as follows:
Lt =
wt∑
i=1
∑
fit
lit
wt
(11)
Vt =
wt∑
i=1
∑
fit+
∑
git
lit
P
(12)
Lt represents the share of links among active agents, while Vt represents the share
of agents in the whole population that can be potentially involved in the process of
coalition formation and evaluation. Figure 8 plots both series over time.
At the very beginning of the simulation, the share of linked agents (series Lt)
and the share of agents that potentially can enter in coalition (series Vt) increase
rapidly. When the first coalitions are established, both series stop to grow because
the number of active agents stabilises (series wt/P ). This is because adopters are no
more available for further coalitions, since they break links with neighbours, reducing
communication between remaining agents. As soon as information starts to flow
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Figure 8: Co-evolution: links, network, coalition and adoption
again (when the share of active agents increases again), the two series start to rise
again but with a different slope. Lt grows faster than Vt because, while the number
of new links (fit) increases (Eq.11), the increasing share of agents in coalition (series
% Adopters) reduces the number of neighbours that could be part of new coalitions
(
∑
fit+
∑
git=lit-
∑
hit in Eq.12). Both curves reach their maximum when the share
of remaining active agents (wt/P ) becomes stable, and eventually decrease until
a stable state. Therefore, constant changes in the social network impact the co-
evolution of coalition formation and diffusion of shared goods.
This feature can be explained better by looking at the actual networks. Figure
9 plots the network configuration of agents (left) and the network structure of all
established coalitions (right) at the end of one simulation run.12
Black nodes and edges represent connected agents belonging to a coalition that
has adopted a shared good (hit). Grey nodes and edges are agents that have been
informed and that have participated to the coalition formation process but remained
singletons (fit). White nodes connected with dotted edges are neither initiators
nor active (git), and could not participated in any process of coalition formation.
The top-left part of the final network configuration in Figure 9 shows a substantial
number of agents that have not been informed during the simulation run, clustered
in the same area. Part of the relative low rate of adoption is then explained by a
slow information flow.
12Because it is not possible to plot an average network configuration over the 40 simulation runs,
for illustrative purposes we plot results from a single simulation, representative in terms of average
numbers of adopters.
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Figure 9: Final configuration: network (left) and coalitions (right)
However, there is also a substantial number of singletons, active agents, between
established coalitions, with no connections to other individuals. As adopters break
their links with neighbours once they coalesce and adopt, some singletons who did
not agree to enter any coalition are left behind. Figure 10 shows a section of the
network in which three agents (69, 71 and 72) are not involved in any of the closest
coalitions (64-65-67-68, 59-60-61-62-63-66-70 and the one including agents 73, 74, 75
and others). Since adopters are out of the game, these three isolated agents cannot
enlarge further their social contacts and a coalition among them does not improve
their utility. The rate of diffusion is therefore reduced by network externalities (El-
liott and Golub, 2013).
Proposition 6: Although coalition formation is necessary for the adoption of
shared goods, it may also reduce future coalitions and adoption by reducing the num-
ber of available links among remaining agents. Coalition formation and diffusion are
co-evolving processes.
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Figure 10: Isolated agents and established coalitions
Network properties of coalitions
Figure 11 plots the relation between network metrics (density, radius and diameter,
and centrality) and coalition size.
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Figure 11: Network metrics
Network radius and diameter (first panel) define the size of networks (the dis-
tance between the two most distant nodes). Both measures are not surprisingly
positively correlated to N , suggesting that the minimum and maximum absolute
shortest paths (or eccentricity) in coalitions increases with size. Hence, the degree
of agents’ connectivity in established coalitions decreases with the size of the group.
Network density (second panel), a proxy of structural cohesion (Friedkin, 1981), is
the ratio between the number of links over the total possible number of links among
agents in a coalition. The negative correlation with coalition’s size suggests that
smaller coalitions are more cohesive than large ones, leaving out a lower number of
isolated potential users. The connectivity within coalitions can be measured with
network centrality (third panel). The level of connections between agents is inversely
proportional to N . This indicates that in larger coalitions the number of links that
agents have with others (Degree), the extent to which agents serve as bridge between
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other coalition members (Betweenness), and agents’ degree of being connected to all
other agents (Closeness) decrease.
Proposition 7: Smaller coalitions formed to buy shared goods are more cohesive
than bigger ones, and agents’ connectivity and centrality is higher.
4.4 The Role of Geography
The relation between the network structure and coalition formation suggests that the
size of the neighbourhood is likely to influence the processes of coalition formation
and the diffusion of shared goods. To examine its role, the model is run with different
initialisations of parameter l (between 4-14), the number of closest neighbours that
an agent can form links with. Figure 12 shows the relation between adoption rates,
the share of active agents, and different values of l.
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Figure 12: Diffusion, in brackets, and share of adopters and active agents per different
values of l
A positive and linear relation is founded between the share of adopters and of
active agents, between these two shares and l, and between the diffusion of common
goods (in brackets) and l. That is, when the good can be shared between users
located at a larger distance, agents have more opportunities to build contacts which
increase adoption than when they can form coalitions with the immediate neigh-
bours. It implies that the more the connections among nodes, the more the spread
of information in the population. This increases agents’ awareness and stimulates
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adoption, as founded in studies of diffusion in networks in relation to adoption of
energy innovations (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012; Tran, 2012).
Figure 13 plots the distribution of coalition size for varying values of l. The
increase of the number of closest neighbours leads to larger coalitions. The higher
the value of l the higher the average number of adopters, and the higher the number of
larger coalitions. It indicates that large number of agents establish bigger coalitions
when the network has a higher degree of clustering.
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Figure 13: Total number of adopters per coalition size and different values of l
Coalition size is also related to the type of good purchased. Figure 14 shows
the distribution of shares of adopters per product. For low values of l, on average,
coalitions decide to buy common goods that have low investment costs and service
supplied. Along with the increase of agents neighbourhood, the share of goods with
higher level of I and S increases.
Proposition 8: As the size of the neighbourhood that can share a good increases
(the service provided is less tied to the location), information about the shared good
flows more rapidly, adoption increases, and established coalitions are, on average,
larger, and formed to buy goods with higher I and S.
4.5 The Role of Initiators
So far we have investigated a system with few initiator agents (m=4, as suggested
by the literature). What happens if all agents in the economy are already aware of
the shared good with strong motivation towards the common investment? In this
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Figure 14: Share of adopters per product and different values of l
section, previous results are compared with the case of all agents being initiators
(m=200) and all are already connected to their closest neighbours (lit=
∑
fit=8 ;∑
git=
∑
hit=0). This initialisation allows to study the co-evolution of coalition
formation and diffusion in a complete network where agents form and evaluate all
possible coalitions. At t=0, agents already know their utility in all possible groups.
This condition is different from the baseline scenario where agents only evaluate
coalitions that can be formed in a network which is not complete and changes its
structure every time step.
Figure 15 compares the share of adopters resulting from the baseline (m=4) and
the complete network scenario (m=200). In complete networks, adoption occurs very
rapidly and the rate of adoption is higher: after few time steps, the share of adopters
reaches its steady state, which is higher than the baseline scenario. This indicates
that full information and the absence of communication, which instead occurs si-
multaneously with the network formation process in the baseline scenario, speeds
up the diffusion of shared goods (and is necessary to obtain the S-shaped diffusion
curve). However, although all agents are informed and connected, differently from
many earlier studies, diffusion does not reach 100%. This implies that, in the com-
plete network, some agents prefer to purchase the service from the central provider,
either due to a higher utility or because these remain isolated (Proposition 6).
Figure 16 plots the distribution of adopted goods by size. In the complete net-
work, the majority of the coalitions buy the largest product, with the highest value
of both I and S (q10). Figure 17 plots the share of adopters per coalition size. Mov-
ing from incomplete (m=4) to complete network (m=200) the average size increases.
When possible, agents decide to establish larger coalitions (Proposition 3) despite
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Figure 15: Share of adopter for different values of m
the high level of negotiation and alternative options. Large groups purchase shared
goods with higher investment cost, and providing higher quantity of the demanded
service (Proposition 1) at a lower unitary cost. In these large groups agents minimise
their individual contribution xi (Proposition 4).
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Figure 16: Share of adopters per product and different values of m
Proposition 9: In a population of fully informed and linked agents, the share of
adopters is higher than in a population where information and connections build as
an outcome of diffusion. However, diffusion does not reach the whole population.
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Figure 17: Share of adopters per coalition size and different values of m
Proposition Variable 1 Variable 2 r
1 Investment Size 0.735***
2 Investment Size heterogeneity 0.892***
3 Size Option evaluated 0.939***
4
Size
Contribution
-0.898***
Investment 0.743*
5 Size Free riders -0.412
7 Size
Diameter 0.972***
Radius 0.968***
Density -0.933***
Degree centrality -0.935***
Closeness centrality -0.934***
Betweenness centrality -0.901***
8 Geography
Diffusion 0.950**
Active agents 0.971**
Adopters 0.977***
r is Pearson correlation coefficient
* p<0.05 ; ** p<0.01 ; *** p<0.001
Table 3: Correlation for propositions
5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper has presented and discussed an agent-based model (ABM) developed to
study the co-evolution of diffusion of expensive shared goods and the formation of
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the coalitions required to adopt them. Differently from earlier studies on diffusion,
this model considers the adoption decision as a collective action, taken by a group
of consumers. These groups are endogenously established in the model: consumers
organise themselves following a bargaining process, as studied in game theory. Links
between agents evolve over time endogenously by means of interpersonal contacts
occurring in the social network. The attempt to combine two streams of literature,
the one on diffusion and the one on coalition formation, capturing the complex
interplay between the two processes by means of an ABM, brings novelty to the
discussion on the diffusion of shared goods, for which a collective adoption is required.
The co-evolution of coalition formation and diffusion of shared good has relevant
implications for sustainable goods. The literature on the diffusion of sustainable en-
ergy is mainly focused on adoption as an individual decision. It studies mainly
small-sized goods, such as water-saving technologies (Schwarz and Ernst, 2009),
micro-cogeneration (Faber et al., 2010), or solar PV panels (Murakami, 2014), which
are affordable by an average consumer. Other studies examine the role of social
interactions and diffusion through networks (Tran, 2012; Bale et al., 2014) and find
that networks directly and indirectly influence the individual choices and preferences
regarding sustainable goods (Choi et al., 2010; Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012) and
might accelerate the diffusion of sustainable energy innovations.
Instead, to study the diffusion of large-sized sustainable goods, such as decen-
tralised energy systems (DES), it is necessary to consider adoption as a collective
decision. DES are energy power sources, scaled to consumers’ needs, that have
to be physically installed close to final users which are directly connected to them
(Hatziargyriou and Meliopoulos, 2002; IEA, 2002). DES are too expensive for indi-
vidual households, but can be purchased by group of neighbours. These systems may
be beneficial only to users that are connected to it and that share its use.13 Diffusion
of DES is as a case of technology adoption that takes place through collective action
and it requires to first study how coalitions are formed.
The analysis presented in this paper is suitable to provide meaningful insights
to assess conditions under which diffusion of DES can easily take off. In order
to facilitate the transition towards a more decentralised energy system, the first
requirement is to increase awareness. This is because spreading information is an
important enabling action (Lin, 1999; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), particularly for
the diffusion of environmental attitudes (Ek and Patrik, 2010) and energy-efficiency
13They can buy and use these systems independently, and experiencing economic benefits (Wat-
son, 2004) Adoption of DES can also be improved by private and public investments. However,
since the focus of this paper in on consumers’ coalitions aiming at purchasing (independently) and
sharing a common property, these aspects are not considered in the model.
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innovations (McMicheal and Shipworth, 2013). DES might diffuse more if consumers
are sufficiently connected, and DES can provide services at higher distance (higher
clustering in the neighbourhoods). Under these conditions, large-sized DES (for
example those between 50MW and 300MW, as defined in Ackermann et al., 2001)
may have a higher probability to be adopted than smaller systems, and, at the same
time, consumers might spend less for their energy consumption.
As simulated in this paper, the adoption of DES is as an emerging bottom-up
process requiring a careful understanding of consumers’ behaviour, features and pref-
erences (Groh et al., 2014; Pasimeni, 2017). A large diffusion of DES might bring
environmental benefits (Hadley and Van Dyke, 2005; Tsikalakis and Hatziargyriou,
2007; Akorede et al., 2010), reduce transmission losses (Chiradeja and Ramakumar,
2004; Pepermans et al., 2005) and enhance energy security (Asmus, 2001; Battaglini
et al., 2009). Further, it enforces the direct involvement of final consumer and their
empowerment, which is determinant not only for the diffusion of DES (Sauter and
Watson, 2007) but also for the overall transition process towards a more sustain-
able economy (European Commission, 2015a,b; Goedkoop and Devine-Wright, 2016;
Hyysalo et al., 2016; Schot et al., 2016). But, as emerged from this paper, if someone
remains isolated from the transition towards a more sustainable energy infrastruc-
ture, this may have a negative impact on social inclusion and on the energy transition
itself.
The model has a number of limitations and can be extended in different ways.
Firstly, data initialisation is set up randomly following a normal distribution but
based on a consistent proportion among parameters but these are not calibrated
on any empirical observation. Second, the model currently does not allow for the
reintroduction in the game of coalition formation adopters agents. Instead, by al-
lowing the reintegration of agents in the game after adoption the model is suitable
to study also the fifth stages of the Innovation-Decision Process in Rogers’ theory
where confirmation of adoption implementation occurs once the product reaches its
maturity phase. Another relevant and possible future extension concerns the im-
pact of different network structures to the co-evolution of coalition formation and
diffusion of common goods without local constrains. Eventually, the model may also
be extended to study related dynamics, such as network and coalition formation in
the international climate agreements (Barrett, 1994; Benchekroun and Claude, 2007;
Tavoni et al., 2011; Balint et al., 2017).
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Annex I
The utility function related to the shared option (Ui2, Eq.6) contains two parameters,
αi and βi, allowing for the linear combination of three elements. The first,
di
di+D−i
, is
approximately the percentage of the total service, S, provided by the common good
and consumed by agent i in coalition (see Eq.8). The second, similarly, xi
xi+X−i
, is
approximately the percentage of the value I of the shared good, purchased by agent
i in coalition by committing own monetary contribution (xi, see Eq.7). The third,
1
N
represents the equally shared percentage of the service based on the number of
coalition members. Eq.6 can be also written as follow:
Ui2(ei; ci2; di;D−i;xi;X−i;N ; θi2;αi; βi) =
(ei − ci2)θi2{αidi + xi di +D−i
xi +X−i
(1− αi)βi + di +D−i
N
(1− αi)(1− βi)}1−θi2 (A1)
Eq.A1 implies that, by neglecting the effect of α and β, agent’s utility function
in coalition, along with the money saved from individual income (first part of the
equation), depends on the linear combination of (i) the individual demand of the
service, (ii) the return of the common investment (total service produced, di +D−i,
divided by the total cost spent to purchase the common good, xi + X−i) multiplied
by the individual monetary contribution committed in the common investment, and
(iii) the total service produced by the common good equally divided to each of the
coalition members.
Figure A1 shows how terms in the utility function, cœeteris paribus, influence
both agent’s utility in coalition and the monetary contribution, and, most impor-
tantly, their relation.
High level of θi2 indicates that an agent has a higher preference to save money,
while low level of θi2 indicates a higher preference to satisfy the demand for the
service. When θi2=1, the utility depends only on the income saved. In the opposite
case, when θi2=0, agent’s utility depends only on consumption. When preference for
income is high (high θi2) (and preference for consumption low), cœteris paribus, an
agent in coalition maximises utility (Ui2) by reducing individual monetary contribu-
tion (xi). When θi2 has a lower value (hence, higher consumption preference), agents
in coalition are willing to contribute more in order to maximise utility.The relation
between di and xi and Ui2 is similar. A higher demand raises the cost (ci2=dip2),
reducing the contribution that maximises utility. Instead, agents in coalition with
higher income (ei) are willing to contribute more, in comparison to those with lower
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θi2 di ei
αi βi N
p2 X−i D−i
Figure A1: impact of model variables on xi and Ui2
income. This is because savings are higher when the income is higher, and utility
increases even if contribution is higher, cœteris paribus.
αi and βi influence individual utility and contribution in opposite ways. With
higher (lower) value of αi (βi), utility reaches its maximum at a low levels of monetary
contribution. This is because αi measures the importance given by an agent to the
proportional division rule based on consumption. The higher is αi, the higher is the
importance assigned to the fact that s/he is using only part of the service provided
by the common good. Therefore, when αi grows, utility decreases. Parameter αi
captures the individualistic perception of the sharing attitude; an agent agrees to
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share the use with others, but, at the same time, is also reluctant to limit her own
consumption. βi instead measures the importance given by an individual to the
proportional division rule based on contribution. Higher value indicates a preference
for consuming a portion of own income while owning and using part of the common
good. Higher βi also signals that agents attach lower relevance to the number of
coalition members. As a result, individuals with high βi are willing to contribute more
to the common purchase, having a higher interest in sharing the cost proportionally
with others. With respect to coalition size (N) individuals participating in smaller
coalitions increase their utility by contributing more than in larger coalitions.
The last three terms are also straightforward. The higher the unit price (p2) of
the service in coalition, the lower the utility. The higher is the other members’ total
contribution (X−i), the lower is the individual contribution as well as the higher is
the other members’ total demand (D−i), the lower the individual contribution. These
two latter characteristics, in combination with other factors in the utility function,
might induce members to free-ride.
Annex II
In order to simplify the explanation of the coalition formation process and its co-
evolving decisional process, an illustrative example is used. The initial parameters
are set as in Table A1. For simplicity, it is assumed that initiators can only choose
one product. Agents are heterogenous only in respect to their demand (di), while
all the other parameters (ei, θi2, θi1, αi and βi) are set equal to all agents. Because
of this heterogeneity, agents acting as singleton have different costs and utilities in
relation to the first option (Table A2).
Parameters Value
p1 10
p2 5
θi1=θi2 0.5
ei 1000
αi 0.5
βi 0.5
S 175
I 200
Table A1: Initial parameters
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Agent 1 2 3 4
di 30 55 35 45
ci1 300 550 350 450
Ui1 145 157 151 157
Table A2: Agents’ parameters
For graphic purposes, the example represents eight agents only, that are located
in a regular lattice. Each of them has four spatially limited potential links in own
neighbourhood. Figure A2 below shows an initiator agent in the population.
1
Figure A2: Initiator (in black) and the regular network structure
Every time step, the initiator ties a link with one of the available neighbours,
which is not linked yet. The choice is done randomly among spatially limited links.
Bidirectional links are formed. The contacted agent becomes active and is informed
of the opportunity to make the common investment. In this example, as shown in
Figure A3, agent-1 contact agent-2 and they establish a link.
In this moment, agent-1 is the initiator while agent-2 is not. Both agents, as well
as all the other agents in the population, satisfy their demand via the central provider
that supplies the requested services. Being singletons, Eq.2 and Eq.3 calculate their
individual cost and utility. Only agent-1, the initiator, can start the process of
coalition formation. Before doing so, a product is chosen (in this example only one
product is available) and the relative joint investment is proposed. The process of
coalition formation starts: agent-1, the initiator, contacts the linked agent-2 (Figure
A3) and they evaluate the joint investment in coalition (Eq.5 and Eq.6). The two
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Figure A3: Step 1: initiator ties link with agent-2
agents make a conditional decision among the option to invest in coalition or to
remain as singleton. The option that makes an agent better off is stored as optimal.
Now, assuming that the coalition (1-2) is not established because it does not
satisfy all the stability conditions the two agents can contact more neighbours and
tie more links, thereby improving and enlarging their network. Only initiators can
do it. At the beginning of each time step, all active agents check their level of
awareness (Eq.1) to become initiators. Assuming that agent-2 becomes initiator in
this step, the two agents can contact one more neighbour each (Action 1), choose
a product (Action 2), and start the process of coalition formation (Action 3). As
shown in Figure A4, agent-1 contacts and forms a link with agent-3 and agent-2 does
the same with agent-4. After that the two initiators choose the product they want
to buy jointly with others, they start the process of coalition formation as explained
before.
The coalition formation starts from initiators. First agent-1 and later agent-2
begin this process by evaluating coalition size 2 and then, depending on the available
links, evaluate bigger coalitions. In this case, the full coalition, size 4, is the largest
they can form. Table A3 below summarises all possible coalitions that can be formed
and evaluated in this network of agents. There are three coalitions with size 2 (1-2,
1-3 and 2-4), two coalitions with size 3 (1-2-3 and 1-2-4) and one coalition with size
4 (1-2-3-4).
The three coalitions with size 2 do not satisfy condition in Eq.7, that is the
total monetary contribution added up by the participants is not enough to cover the
investment cost. Consequently, these three coalitions are not feasible and they do
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34
Figure A4: Step 2: Initiators tie one link each
Agent Agent
Coalition 1 2 3 4
∑
xi ≥ I
∑
di ≤ S 1 2 3 4
1-2 xi 101 72 173 x 85 X stop
1-3 xi 97 89 186 x 65 X stop
2-4 xi 78 88 166 x 65 X stop
1-2-3 xi 138 76 127 341 X 120 X continue decision
ci2 288 351 302 ci2 < ci1 X X X
Ui2 163 169 164 Ui2 > Ui1 X X X
1-2-4 xi 142 84 108 334 X 130 X continue decision
ci2 292 359 333 ci2 < ci1 X X X
Ui2 167 173 171 Ui2 > Ui1 X X X
1-2-3-4 xi 161 81 145 113 500 X 165 X continue stop
ci2 311 365 320 338 ci2 < ci1 x X X X
Ui2 163 169 164 167 Ui2 > Ui1 X X X X
Table A3: Coalitions evaluated
not provide any optimal conditional decision for the agents involved. Agents stop
evaluating these coalitions. Then, agents evaluate the two coalitions with size 3.
These satisfy both conditions in Eq.7 and Eq.8, so agents continue the evaluation
process and consider their individual cost and utility in coalition (Eq.9 and Eq.10).
All agents are better off in these two groups, therefore, the two coalitions size 3
are subject to further negotiation in the final decisional step. In the option of the
full coalition, size 4, even if it satisfies both initial conditions, agent-1 does not
experience improvement compared to the singleton option (cost in coalition is higher).
Therefore, agent-1 does not agree to form this coalition, which implies that this is
not a feasible solution. Consequently, the full coalition is not further considered by
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agents.
The four agents involved in the final decisional step have their own optimal con-
ditional decision. Agent-1 and agent-2 want to establish coalition (1-2-4) since their
utility is higher than in coalition (1-2-3). On the one hand, agent-3 has coalition
(1-2-3) as the only available option to improve individual utility. Agent-4, on the
other hand, has coalition (1-2-4) as the only available option to improve individual
utility. Based on these considerations that agents make explicit, coalition (1-2-4)
is established. This implies that these three agents have coordinated their efforts,
agreed on the monetary contribution and that they jointly purchase the common
good. Coalition is established, and it means that coalition members are out of the
game, making agent-3 isolated in the network. Figure A5 shows how network in Fig-
ure A4 evolves after adoption. The three agents in the established coalition (1-2-4)
break the existing links, those already formed (e.g. link 1-3) and those potentially
available in their neighbourhood (e.g. links 2-3, 3-4, etc.). Agent-3, then, remains
isolated. Nevertheless, being active agent, in the next time steps agent-3 will check
whether or not could become initiator (Eq.1). If so, agent-3 can continue the process
with the remaining agents in the population.
1
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34
Figure A5: Step 3: coalition established and agent-3 isolated
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Annex III
Uncertainty
Figure A6 shows a cumulative adoption curve where uncertainties are added at the
beginning of the simulation. For the initial times steps, utility in coalition is slightly
reduced by means of a coefficient representing a lower utility for early adopters.
This produces a lower degree of cumulative adoption in the first stages of the process
compared to the case without uncertainties (dotted line, equal to that in Figure
2. However, a slower adoption implies that contacts among agents increase, since
more agents are in the game. And, as explained in both sections 4.4 and 4.5, more
communication implies higher adoption, as indicated by the higher final share in
figure below.
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Figure A6: S-shaped diffusion curve
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